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 Political communication research recently has taken a promising and 
interesting turn, examining whether political conservatives and political 
liberals process messages very differently.  This turn has been led by George 
Lakoff who lately has been prompting U.S. liberals about how they must 
frame their messages; he also has chastised them for surrendering political 
discourse to political conservatives, specifically letting the conservatives 
frame the terms of debate (Lakoff, 2010).   
The Lakoff claims fit well within Attribution Theory and largely have 
been advanced regarding the United States.  This research seeks to test 
whether these phenomena are culture-specific to the U. S. or if such 
processing of political messages is a more universal phenomenon.  Specifically 
the researcher conducts a secondary analysis of four large international polls 
and one national poll, the Polish General Social Survey.   The polls all featured 
questions about why others are poor or wealthy.  All these polls also asked 
questions about political philosophy, liberal to conservative.  If the Lakoff 
points “travel well,” then political conservatives, true to Attribution Theory, 
will see both poverty and wealth as a consequence of individual traits.  
Political liberals would point to social conditions for both wealth and poverty.    
 
Literature Review 
 Attribution Theory observes that people have a compelling need to explain things.  
These explanations break down into things internal to the self or to an outside force. 
Advancing Attribution Theory, Zucker and Weiner (2006) studied attribution of 
the causes of poverty by student and non-student U. S. samples.  In both 
samples conservatism correlated positively with individual causes and 
negatively with societal causes.  The Zucker and Weiner work largely 
validates Lakoff’s observations (2002, 2004, 2008) that in the U. S. conservatives 
and Republicans take a "stern father" approach to issues, finding individual fault for 
almost any problem, while Democrats and liberals look to external forces.   
 Harmon (2010a) built on these works by testing their conclusions against six U.S. 
public opinion polls.  Secondary analysis found consistent and strong relationships.  
Conservatives and Republicans overwhelmingly attributed poverty to the personal 
failings of the poor themselves (lazy, drunk, etc.) while Democrats and liberals 
consistently offered social explanations like poor schools and lousy jobs for poverty.  
Later he looked at the inverse question, the reasons respondents give for others obtaining 
wealth (2010b).  Generally he found that Democrats and liberals attributed wealth to 
connections or being born into a wealthy family, while Republicans and conservatives 
declared wealth comes from hard work. 
 Several studies suggest these phenomena are cross-cultural, and not just an 
American pattern. Wagstaff (1983) studied attitudes toward the poor among 
respondents in Liverpool and Glasgow, using MacDonald's Poverty Scale and 
the Protestant Ethic Scale.  He found supporters of the British Conservative 
Party more likely to blame the poor for their plight.  Labour Party supporters 
were much less likely to do so.  Supporters of the Liberal/SDF Alliance fell 
somewhere in between.  Similarly Pandey et al (1982) found those in India 
with a right-wing orientation take more negative attitudes toward the poor 
than those with a left-wing orientation.  Ideas about wealth also are very 
resilient.  Prabhakar (2008) conducted seven focus groups with 58 members of 
the English public about wealth taxes.  He hoped to counteract the “death 
taxes” frame on estate taxes with other ways of framing the issue.  
Participants, however, generally clung to opposition to wealth and 
inheritance taxes even when presented with substantial contrary 
information. 
 International, multi-nation surveys clearly are of self-evident value in 
extending research linking political orientation and “why poor” and “why 
rich” responses.  Surveys within individual nation states, however, also can 
be valuable in such research.  Poland, for example, represents a good 
opportunity to test further whether political liberalism consistently correlates 
with the attribution of both wealth and poverty to social conditions, while 
political conservatives rely on individual strengths and weaknesses to explain 
both wealth and poverty.  The Polish General Social Survey (Cichomski, 
Jerzynski, and Zielinski, 2004) offers an elaborate series of several questions in which 
respondents are queried about the reasons for wealth and poverty.  
 Recent political crosscurrents in Poland also make the inquiry intriguing.  Poland, 
Nawojczyk and Walton (2004) argued, has a unique mythology of wealth that can be 
found in both its peasant and literary subcultures.  Public opinion, they noted, was fairly 
negative toward the 1990s burst of wealth accumulation, and attitudes lingered that the 
Polish business elite used shady practices to obtain and maintain wealth.  Paczynksa 
(2002) adds that Poland has bifurcated into two classes: a small, well-educated urban and 
upscale group active in civic life; and a poor, rural, dissatisfied class less likely to 
participate in civic life or to see democracy and universally beneficent. 
 
 Methods 
 
 The researcher obtained from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and 
Social Research (www.icpsr.org) the following surveys:  the Polish General 
Social Survey, 1992-2002 (Cichomski, Jerzynski, and Zielinski, 2004); the International 
Social Survey Program (ISSP) surveys on Social Inequality, 1992; International Social 
Justice Project 1991 and 1996 (Wegener and Mason, 1996); World Values Survey 
aggregate data 1981-2000 (Inglehart, 2006); and Eurobarometer 67.1 (Papacostas, 2007).  
The data were downloaded and imported into Statistical Package for the 
Social Sciences (SPSS) files for data analysis.   
 The 1992 ISSP surveys were first made available to the ICPSR in May 
1996.  They contains multistage probability samples and data from: Australia, 
Germany, Great Britain, the United States, Austria, Hungary, Italy, Norway, 
Sweden, Czechoslovakia, Slovenia, Poland, Bulgaria, Russia, New Zealand, 
Canada, and the Philippines.   Respondents (total N of 23,093) aged 18 and 
older were asked about equality of income, wealth, and opportunity; the 
extent of present inequality; explanations for inequality; and support for 
government programs to reduce inequality.  In the ISSP surveys, political 
philosophy was identified on a five-point scale from 1 (very liberal/left) to 5 
(very conservative/right).  Possible reasons for success were scaled from 1 
(essential) to 5 (not important).   
 The International Social Justice Project was a collaboration among 13 
countries to determine popular perceptions of economic and social justice.  
Countries participating in the 1991 and 1996 surveys were: Bulgaria, East 
Germany, Estonia, Great Britain, Hungary, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Russia, Slovenia, the United States, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the final 
two known as Czechoslovakia in the 1991 survey.  Political partisanship and 
political ideology were scaled from l very liberal party to 5 very conservative 
party.  Reasons for poverty and wealth shared the same five-point scale from 
very often to never. 
 World Values Survey respondents self-identified on a political scale from 1 (very 
left) to 10 (very right).  A question on the causes of poverty had the following stated 
answering options: because they have been unlucky, because of laziness and lack of 
willpower, because there is much injustice in our society, and it’s an inevitable part of 
progress.  The World Values Surveys cover multiple waves of data collection covering 
the time period of 1982 through 2000.  The four-wave aggregate covers more than 
250,000 respondents in 80 countries.  It is available from the World Values Survey 
website (http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSData.jsp?Idioma=I) as well as that of the 
ICPSR and the Association for Religion Data Archives 
(http://www.thearda.com/Archive/Files/Descriptions/WVSAGG.asp). 
 Eurobarometer data came from surveys of citizens of the European Union aged 15 
and over residing in the 27 EU member countries.  Total sample size was 27,746.  
Eurobarometer used the same political scale and four-option explanations for poverty as 
in the World Values Survey.  It also asked a question about which three out of a long list 
of reasons “might best explain why people are poor or excluded from our society.” 
 The 1997, 1999, and 2002 Polish surveys had extensive modules on 
wealth and poverty.  All were field surveys of adults at least 18 years old.  
The 1997 survey yielded 2402 completed questionnaires.  In 1999 the figure 
was 2282 completed surveys, and in 2002 it was 2473 completed surveys.  
The total sample size of those participating in both the political philosophy 
question and the wealth and poverty module typically ranged from roughly 
1900 to 2200.  Respondents identified their political philosophy on a scale 
from very left (1) to very right (10).   Reasons for poverty or wealth were 
scaled from (1) very often to (5) very rarely or never.   
 For both the ISSP and Polish GSS surveys, these scales allowed for 
simple regressions to see how well self-reported political philosophy 
correlated with reasons given for wealth and poverty.  The questions in both 
were scaled so a negative Beta and t-value indicated the reason is more 
strongly favored by the political right than by the political left.  Positive Beta 
and t-values indicate reasons more strongly preferred by political left (liberal) 
as opposed to the political right (conservative).   The researcher recoded the 
data in both only to one small degree.  The numerical codes for no data or no 
answer were set to “system missing” so as not to affect the calculations. 
 The researcher anticipated that, based on past work in the U.S., U.K., 
and India, political liberalism in all sets of surveys will correlate strongly 
with social explanations for both wealth and poverty, while political 
conservatism in all surveys will correlate strongly with individual 
characteristics of the poor and rich explaining both wealth and poverty. 
 
 Findings 
 
 Secondary analysis of the Polish General Social Survey, 1992-2002, 
generally followed the expected cross-cultural pattern of political ideology 
strongly predicting how respondents explain poverty and wealth.  Right-wing 
Poles explained poverty in terms of the individual failings of the poor—
laziness, drunkenness, and inability to save.  Conversely, left-wing Poles saw 
poverty as a failure of the economic system, a lack of state protection, a 
consequence of the introduction of a market economy, and bad luck.  The only 
characteristic of the poor stressed by self-described left-wing Poles was their 
lack of connections (Table 1). 
 Right-wing Poles tilted toward admirable personal characteristics to 
explain wealth, namely hard work, saving, and exercising moderation and 
restraint.   Left-wing Poles had a decidedly different view of how wealth had 
been accumulated and maintained.  They mention a system that allows unfair 
advantage and exercises little systemic control over high incomes.  
Furthermore, in an echo of the Nawojczyk and Walton observations, dishonest 
behavior was cited as a factor in wealth (Table 2). 
 A few stated reasons for both wealth and poverty did not yield a significant 
difference by political philosophy.  Education/qualifications, or the lack thereof, were not 
significantly different as cited by Polish liberals and conservatives, neither did coming 
from a wealthy/poor family.  Ability/talent or the lack of it was not significantly different 
between liberal and conservative Poles as a cited reason for wealth, but fell just short of 
significance (p =.051) as a stated reason for poverty—with conservatives tilting more 
toward citing a lack of ability as a cause.   
 Sometimes a stated reason and its inverse did not yield the same result.  For 
example, dishonest behavior yielded a significant difference with liberals more than 
conservatives citing it as a source of wealth.  However, honest behavior did not yield a 
statistically significant difference between Polish left and right as a reason for poverty.   
Perhaps, at least in the eyes of many Poles, dishonesty can play a role in becoming rich, 
but honesty doesn’t necessarily doom one to a life of poverty.  Liberals but not 
conservatives cited bad luck, lack of connections, and the introduction of a market 
economy as a reason for poverty, but the difference between right and left was not 
significant for luck, connections, and a market economy as reasons for wealth.  
 Poles not only broke down by political philosophy on reasons for wealth /poverty 
but also had different ideas about the percentage of their countrymen who were rich and 
poor.  The right-wing more than the left-wing estimated a higher percentage of rich 
people (Sum of Squares 23.883, F = 4.745, Beta .048, t = 2.178, p = .029).  The political 
left more than the right estimated a higher percentage of poor people (Sum of Squares 
56.416, F = 11.314, Beta = -.034, t = -3.364, p =.001). 
 The multinational ISSP surveys offered even stronger connections between political 
philosophy and stated reasons for “getting ahead in life.”  Conservatives once again 
attributed success to the personal characteristics ambition, natural ability, and hard work.  
They also credited a person’s religion as important, perhaps more of a bow to the moral 
framework of religion than to any suggestion of religious discrimination.   Liberals 
offered more social/political/economic external factors such as being born to a wealthy 
family, having well-educated parents, knowing the right people, and having political 
connections.  Liberals also were more likely than conservatives to suggest race, gender, 
and political beliefs could be reasons for either advancement or mobility-crushing 
discrimination.  Liberals more than conservatives also cited education as a success factor 
(Table 3). 
 In fact, of the 13 success factors tested by ISSP twelve yielded statistically 
significant relationships associated with political philosophy.  Only the suggested 
“success reason” of coming from a particular region fell shy of significance (Sum of 
Squares 2.976, F = 3.408, Beta -.019, t = -1.846, p =.065).   
 The International Social Justice Project asked about reasons for poverty, as well as 
reasons for wealth.  The political right overwhelmingly tilted toward loose morals and 
lack of effort as explaining the plight of the poor.  The political left was much more likely 
to cite discrimination, unequal opportunity, and the failures of the economic system.  The 
political left also opted for a multitude of reasons for wealth: connections, dishonesty, 
economic injustice, and more opportunities made available to the already wealth.  The 
political right saw wealth as deriving from hard work (Table 4). 
 The 20,106 World Values Survey respondents who as their first choice to explain 
poverty blamed laziness or lack of willpower among the poor themselves averaged 5.80 
on the ten-point left to right political scale, compared to 5.54 for unlucky (N=9975), 5.53 
for part of modern progress (N=14,258), and 5.07 for injustice in society (N=27,183).  
These differences were statistically significant (ANOVA Sum of Squares 6,538.271, 
df=3, Mean Square = 2,179.424, F = 502.194, p <.000). 
 Eurobarometer yielded very similar results.  The 4,392 citing laziness averaged 
5.76 on the political scale, compared to 5.54 for inevitable part of progress (N=2951), 
5.39 for unlucky (N=4033), and 5.05 for injustice (N=7863).   Furthermore, when one 
compares mentions to lack of mentions, the “check three reasons for poverty” question 
yielded further support to the observation that personal failings of the poor are cited by 
right-wingers while the political left opts for social and economic explanations for 
poverty.  If one sets the bar for significant difference at a very high level, p < .0005, the 
differences are startlingly evident.  The right-wing overwhelmingly are more likely to say 
“they don’t do enough to get by” or say the poor are drunk or addicted, while left-wingers 
select more often social and economic issues like low pay, insufficient affordable 
housing, insufficient number of jobs (long-term unemployment), discrimination, and lack 
of concern from the people around the impoverished (Table 5). 
  
 Discussion 
 
 This paper largely confirmed that in Poland and in the multiple nations surveyed in 
the ISSP, World Values Surveys, and Eurobarometer self-identified political right 
wingers followed the pattern previously noted in the U. S., U. K., and India, namely that 
conservatives explain poverty and wealth largely as a consequence of personal failings or 
strengths.  Self-identified liberals or left-wing persons explain poverty and wealth in 
terms of systemic failures of unregulated markets, family connections, discrimination, 
and government policies or practices that serve elites and “stack the deck” against 
advancement of the poor.  
 Furthermore, Poles, or at least liberal Poles, add a twist that dishonesty has played a 
strong role in the modern political economy of the country, playing a key role in 
establishing and maintaining post-communist “have’s” and “have nots.”  This finding fits 
Polish historical mythologies described by Nawojczyk and Walton, as well as modern 
hierarchical realities noted by Paczynksa. 
 These secondary analyses add to a building body of research that answers to the 
questions “Why Are People Poor?” and “Why Are People Rich?” represent clear and 
consistent cleavages in the public and the electorate.  Across several cultures, those who 
identify as conservative blame the poor for their condition, and laud the rich for theirs—
relying almost exclusively on personal strengths and weaknesses for attribution of these 
phenomena.  Those who identify as liberal see a mix of social, political, and economic 
external forces shaping the fates of those who are poor and those who are wealthy.  These 
findings fit well with Attribution Theory. 
   The author did not venture into how well answers to “why poor” and “why rich” 
correlate with political party in Poland or other countries.  That question represents a 
promising area for scholars who have plumbed the shifting tides of parties and 
allegiances in those countries.  Other promising areas for future inquiry include 
secondary analyses of other existing data sets to see if the pattern holds true, or, better 
still, original data collections specifically aimed at the “why poor” and “why rich” 
questions.  Perhaps future editions of research like the Pew Global Attitudes Project 
could borrow some of these questions and put them to good use. 
Table 1. Reasons for Poverty and Political Left-Right from Polish GSS 
 
Reason Sum of 
Squares 
F Beta t p 
Loose Morals, 
Drunkenness 
104.909 21.466 -.098 -4.633 .000 
Laziness 47.477 9.687 -.066 -3.112 .002 
Inability to Save 57.090 11.587 -.073 -3.404 .001 
      
Failure of Economic 
System 
41.193 8.201 .063 2.864 .004 
Lack of Connections 28.314 5.781 .051 2.404 .016 
Introduction of Market 
Economy 
54.242 10.918 .074 3.304 .001 
Bad Luck 22.784 4.615 .046 2.149 .032 
Lack of State Protection 33.203 6.732 .055 2.595 .010 
 
Not Significant: Lack of Education and Qualifications, Coming from a Poor 
Family, Lack of Ability and Talent, Honest Behavior. 
 
 
Table 2.  Reasons for Wealth and Political Left-Right from Polish GSS 
 
Reason Sum of 
Squares 
F Beta t p 
Hard Work 64.485 13.163 -.077 -3.628 .000 
Ability to Save 34.169 6.939 -.056 -2.634 .008 
Exercising Moderation 
and Restraint 
38.182 7.748 -.061 -2.783 .005 
      
Lack of Control over High 
Incomes 
88.216 17.897 .091 4.230 .000 
Economic System Allows 
for Unfair Advantage 
35.711 7.243 .058 2.691 .007 
Dishonest Behavior 93.287 19.019 .093 4.361 .000 
 
Not Significant: Education and Qualifications, Coming from a Wealthy 
Family, Connections, Luck, Introduction of Market Economy, Abilities and 
Talent. 
 
 
Table 3.  ISSP Multi-Nation Survey, Left-Right and Reasons for Getting Ahead 
 
Reason Sum of 
Squares 
F Beta t p 
Ambition 24.875 33.820 -.059 -5.816 .000 
Natural Ability 15.100 20.471 -.046 -4.524 .000 
Hard Work 66.887 87.813 -.094 -9.371 .000 
Person’s Religion 11.152 12.569 -.036 -3.545 .000 
      
Wealthy Family 27.821 23.168 .049 4.813 .000 
Well-Educated Parents 4.360 4.209 .021 2.052 .040 
Good Education 32.366 40.763 .064 6.385 .000 
Knowing the Right People 22.194 23.172 .049 4.814 .000 
Political Connections 64.712 54.100 .075 7.355 .000 
Person’s Race 20.520 16.110 .041 4.014 .000 
Born a Man or Woman 21.038 17.515 .043 4.185 .000 
Political Beliefs 37.020 37.113 .062 6.092 .000 
 
Not Significant: Region Comes From. 
 
 
 
Table 4.  ISJP Multi-Nation Survey, Left-Right Political Parties and 
Respondent Reasons for Poverty/Wealth 
 
Reason Sum of 
Squares 
F Beta t p 
Poverty: Loose Morals 33.977 27.121 -.059 -5.208 .000 
Poverty: No Effort 139.649 118.707 -.122 -10.895 .000 
Poverty: Discrimination 138.244 105.199 .116 10.257 .000 
Poverty: No Equal Opp. 143.432 117.050 .121 10.819 .000 
Poverty: Economic 
System 
197.409 140.288 .133 11.844 .000 
      
Wealth: Dishonesty 41.199 18.386 .047 4.288 .000 
Wealth: Hard Work 7.615 3.930 -.022 -1.982 .047 
Wealth: Connections 42.427 28.475 .058 5.336 .000 
Wealth: More 
Opportunity 
107.878 58.583 .083 7.654 .000 
Wealth: Economic 
Injustice 
143.657 46.842 .074 6.844 .000 
 
Not Significant: Ability/Talent, Luck 
Table 5.  Eurobarometer, Left-Right Mean on Ten-Point Scale and Reasons 
Given for Poverty, Mentioned (M) versus Not Mentioned (NM), choose three 
list. 
 
Reason Mean N Std Dev   t  / p 
Social benefits not high enough     (M) 5.29 7225 2.302 t = 4.0754 
  in our country                                  
(NM) 
5.42 13833 2.141 p <.0001 
     
There is a lack of concern from       (M) 5.17 2560 2.195 t = 4.9650 
 people around them                         
(NM) 
5.40 18498 2.197 p <.0001 
     
They suffer from a long-term         (M)     5.43 5699 2.178 t = 2.3469 
illness or disability                           
(NM) 
5.35 15359 2.205 p = .0189 
     
They have been through a family    (M) 5.43 4511 2.136 t = 2.1674 
break-up or lost a family member 
(NM) 
5.35 16547 2.214 p = .0302 
     
Their current work                             
(M) 
5.29 6481 2.243 t = 3.6576 
   doesn’t pay enough                        
(NM) 
5.41 14577 2.177 p = .0003 
     
They suffer from alcoholism,            
(M) 
5.52 7979 2.153 t = 7.6977 
  drug abuse or other addictions    
(NM) 
5.28 13079 2.220 p < .0001 
     
They have been unemployed           (M) 5.28 7797 2.156 t = 4.7838 
  for a long time                                   
(NM) 
5.43 1326 2.221 p < .0001 
     
They lack education                         (M) 5.44 4970 2.121 t = 2.5233 
                                                               
(NM) 
5.35 16088 2.221 p = .0116 
     
They don’t do enough to get by     (M) 5.71 3371 2.213 t = 9.7062 
                                                                
(NM) 
5.31 17867 2.189 p < .0001 
     
Their parents were poor                  (M) 5.23 1105 2.262 t = 2.2086 
                                                                5.38 19953 2.194 p = .0272 
(NM) 
     
Discrimination based on ethnic origin 
(M) 
4.91 1651 2.109 t = 8.8898 
age, disability, or sexual orientation  
(NM)                     
5.41 19407 2.201 p < .0001 
     
They cannot locate affordable         (M) 5.16 1283 2.117 t = 3.6324 
      housing                                            
(NM) 
5.39 19775 2.203 p = .0003 
 
Not significant: They live in a poor area; they have too many children.
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